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Abstract
In 2004, the representatives of Latin American coun-
tries, gathered in Mexico City, devised a multilateral 
Plan of Action (MPA) in order to foster an improvement 
on refugee protection mechanisms in the region . Among 
its many proposals, the document advanced the idea of 
borders of solidarity . The proposal calls attention to new 
forms of thinking about border zones and border lives 
and how different actors might dialogue to improve the 
reception, assistance, and protection of displaced groups 
in a region marked by deep social inequalities and polit-
ical violence . This paper is an attempt to make sense of 
these assumed new modes of governance of borders, try-
ing to elucidate multiple perspectives and mechanisms 
of dealing with life in displacement in border contexts . 
The paper follows the narratives stemming from national 
and international officials, NGO and assistance work-
ers, and displaced families’ associations, in the context of 
the Tri-Border area between Brazil, Colombia, and Peru . 
The paper aims to unveil how each discourse deals with 
the (dis)connections between borders, displacement, and 
protection . I argue that perceptions of the role of borders, 
as both bridges and barriers, and as spaces of life, vary 
according to how each group appropriates and interferes 
in the political dialogue . Some focus on the management 
of mobility; others on the improvement of life conditions 
for marginal groups; still others try to interrupt the pol-
itical processes that make such marginalization possible 
in the first place . I propose three varying understandings 
of solidarity that speak to each of these perspectives—
managerial, faith-based, and autonomous—stressing 
the problems and also the positive aspects that might be 
learned from approaching borders through the lenses of 
solidarity .
Résumé
En 2004, des représentants des pays latino-américains, 
réunis à Mexico, ont élaboré un plan d’action multilatéral 
en vue de favoriser une amélioration des mécanismes de 
protection des réfugiés dans la région . Parmi ses nombreu-
ses propositions, le document avance l’idée de frontières de 
la solidarité . La proposition attire l’attention sur de nou-
velles formes de réflexion sur les zones et vies frontalières 
et comment les différents acteurs pourraient dialoguer afin 
d’améliorer l’accueil, l’assistance et la protection des grou-
pes de personnes déplacées dans une région où règnent la 
violence politique et de profondes inégalités sociales . Le pré-
sent article tente, en donnant un sens à ces supposés nou-
veaux modes de gouvernance des frontières, d’éclaircir de 
multiples perspectives et mécanismes  pour affronter la vie 
en déplacement dans des contextes frontaliers . L’auteure 
s’appuie sur les récits issus de hauts placés nationaux et 
internationaux, des intervenants des ONG et de l’aide, 
et des associations de familles déplacées dans le contexte 
de la zone tri-frontalière entre le Brésil, la Colombie et le 
Pérou . L’auteure vise à dévoiler la façon dont chaque dis-
cours prend en compte les (dis)jonctions entre frontières, 
déplacement et protection . Elle soutient que la perception 
du rôle des frontières, comme ponts et barrières aussi bien 
que comme espaces de vie, varie en fonction de la façon 
dont chaque groupe s’approprie le dialogue politique et s’y 
immisce . Certains se concentrent sur la gestion de la mobi-
lité, d’autres sur l’amélioration des conditions de vie des 
groupes marginaux, d’autres encore tentent d’interrompre 
les processus politiques qui rendent une telle marginalisa-
tion possible en premier lieu . L’auteure propose trois inter-
prétations différentes de la solidarité qui approfondissent 
chacune de ces perspectives — managériale, confession-
nelle et autonome — en soulignant les aspects négatifs 
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mais aussi positifs qui pourraient être tirés d’une approche 
des frontières à travers le prisme de la solidarité .
There is a lot of pain and misunderstanding; 
the border remains an infected wound . 
Perhaps the utopian spirit of the 
border project lies in its impossibility . 
—Guillermo Gomez-Pena, Warrior from Gringostoika
In 2004, the representatives of Latin American countries, gathered in Mexico City, devised a multilateral Plan of Action (MPA) in order to foster an improvement of refu-
gee protection mechanisms in the region . Among its many 
proposals, the document advanced the idea of “borders of 
solidarity .” Though not conveying the idea of an open bor-
ders project, the proposal certainly calls attention to new 
forms of thinking about border zones and border lives and 
how different actors might dialogue to improve the recep-
tion, assistance, and protection of displaced groups in a 
region marked by deep social inequalities and political 
violence . If a No Borders project presents the case against 
immigration controls and entails a radical redemocratiza-
tion of borderlands,1 to think about borders as geographical 
imaginaries of solidarity leads us to interpret the border not 
as “a category but rather a perspective .”2 In this way, borders 
can be reappropriated by new modes of governance and, at 
the same time, be rethought as spaces of life . Therefore, per-
haps, the most ambitious aspect of borders of solidarity is 
precisely to highlight the moment in which being displaced 
acquires the meaning of living as border and boundaries are 
subsumed into a rather provocative evocation of an indiffer-
entiation between the limits of life and the limits of modern 
geographies . By trying to elucidate multiple approaches and 
mechanisms of dealing with displaced and refugee popula-
tions in border contexts, this paper elaborates on the per-
spectivism of solidarity practices .
The reflections presented here are the result of fieldwork 
conducted in 2007 in the Tri-Border area of Brazil, Peru, 
and Colombia, more specifically in the twin cities of Leticia 
and Tabatinga . The paper follows the narratives stemming 
from national and international officials, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and assistance workers, and dis-
placed families’ associations in this particular context in 
order to unveil how each discourse deals with the (dis)con-
nections between borders, displacement, and protection . I 
argue that perceptions of the role of borders, as both bridges 
and barriers, and as spaces of life, vary according to how 
each group appropriates and interferes in the political dia-
logue . Some focus on the management of mobility; others on 
the improvement of life conditions for marginal groups; still 
others try to interrupt the political processes that make such 
marginalization possible in the first place . I propose three 
varying understandings of solidarity that speak to each of 
these perspectives: managerial, faith-based, and autono-
mous solidarity . Though presented in parallel fashion, these 
three perspectives on the linkage of borders and solidarity 
are actually intertwined in the everyday practices of border 
dwellers . The attempt to advance solidarity as a search for 
autonomy (evinced by the social organization of displaced 
families) challenges aspects of the regulation and manage-
ment of mobility as well as reinforces a discourse of rights 
and inclusion that is premised on statist and citizenship-
based categories . In a sense, all perspectives are marked by 
a certain ambivalence that is constitutive of displacement as 
social practices that deal with the dual processes of ordering 
the world in dichotomies (citizen/alien; migrants/refugees; 
subject/object; rooted/displaced) and thinking the world 
from dichotomous concepts .3 Thus, the paper aims at con-
tributing to a more critical analysis of what borders of soli-
darity might actually promote and how they can impact on 
the daily lives of those who inhabit such sites .
The paper is organized in five sections . In the first sec-
tion, I present a brief description of the Tri-Border area, 
highlighting the paradoxes of distance and proximity as 
well as the overall political context in which the narratives 
of groups emerge . The second section discusses the over-
all policies presented in the MPA and analyzes some of 
Border marker between Leticia and Tabatinga along Avenida da 
Amizade (Friendship Avenue) . Carolina Moulin, 2007, personal 
archive .
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its consequences . The third section discusses the views of 
assistance workers, in particular, those associated with the 
Catholic missionaries in the region . The fourth examines 
the narratives stemming from displaced groups’ associa-
tions, focusing on the difficulties and strategies of interven-
tion devised by them to advance their claims in a context 
of social and political abjection . The fifth and concluding 
section advances a classification of solidarity approaches 
in relation to borders, stressing the problems and also the 
positive aspects that might be learned from each set of 
discourses .
Representing the Border Landscape
The Tri-Border area between Peru, Brazil, and Colombia is 
located in the heart of the Amazon forest . The main urban 
centers are the twin cities of Tabatinga, Brazil, and Leticia, 
Colombia, the latter being the capital of the Departamento 
de Amazonas . The twin cities are physically joined and blend 
into each other . Transit and movement are free between 
the cities, as there is no border controlling post along the 
avenue that connects them . From the Colombian side, it 
is only possible to reach Leticia by plane or by a very long 
and treacherous journey combining paths and boat trips . 
Tabatinga is connected to the provincial capital, Manaus, 
some 1,600 kilometres away, by plane—only one flight dur-
ing business days—or by boat in a three- to five-day jour-
ney (depending on the direction, whether up or down the 
river) . Control of goods and people takes place only on the 
Brazilian side, some 50 kilometres down the Amazon River, 
in what is called Base Anzol (Hook’s Base) . The Hook serves 
as a customs, security, and immigration-processing check-
point . There, a handful of federal police agents are respon-
sible for checking the documents and cargo of all the boats 
sailing into Brazilian territory . Their main goal is to check 
passports and to look for drugs . In my conversations with 
local populations, many have shown intimate fear in rela-
tion to that checkpoint . They are often asked to open every-
thing and many have told me about cases of racial profil-
ing, abuse, and discrimination among travellers, especially 
those of Colombian origin . “As the Head of the Brazilian 
Federal Police in town told me, there is very little that passes 
unnoticed at the Hook .
The massive Amazon River criss-crossing the exuberant 
landscape and the supposedly free movement of peoples 
and merchandise along the avenues, streets, and fluvial 
routes are at odds with the violence (at least one violent 
death per day is registered in town), poverty, lack of pub-
lic services, and a not-so-subtle military/police enforce-
ment presence along its edges . In total, more than one hun-
dred thousand people live in the region . They rely on the 
informal economy, exchanges of goods, and the few public 
service positions available in town (with both the local gov-
ernment and the military) to survive . The idyllic landscape 
provides a postcard background for a politically convoluted 
context, marked by a precarious political economy . There is 
no industry or reasonable public investment, a lack of basic 
Map of the adjoining cities of Tabatinga, Brazil, and Leticia, 
Colombia, and nearby Santa Rosa, Peru .
Bairro União (Union Neighbourhood): an occupied area along 
the borderline between Tabatinga and Leticia . Most of its 
inhabitants are poor peasants from mixed nationalities and also 
from indigenous background . In the flood season, water runs 
beneath the houses along with the garbage and sewage that is 
throw in there . Carolina Moulin, 2007, personal archive .
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infrastructure, and an increasing pressure from guerrilla 
and paramilitary groups reliant on a transnational network 
of drug trafficking and on multiple forms of exploitation of 
people’s social vulnerabilities .
The border has a dual impact on the city . It alters the 
cultural and social landscape; the city operates in bilingual 
mode and all three currencies (real, pesos, and soles) are 
accepted in most stores . The cabloco face, that of the mixture 
of white and indigenous peoples, marks the typical image 
of its inhabitants . At the same time, federal and provincial 
authorities consider the region as a strategic crossroads for 
sovereign presence and control over human mobility .  
At certain moments, the twin cities portray worlds that 
seem miles apart, either by the imposition of state regula-
tions, by language differences, or by the absence of polit-
ical discussions within the local transnational context of 
the historical and social realities that are enmeshed in this 
particular time-space zone . Brazilians seem, in general, 
surprisingly ignorant of the forty-year-old civil war that 
has disrupted their fellow neighbours, though they are very 
much aware of the Colombian and Peruvian presence in the 
city, and also of the circulation of money and drugs that 
is pervasive there . It is common to hear people state that 
there is not a single family in Tabatinga who has not relied 
at some point on “dirty” drug money . Twenty-five per cent 
of its population is of Colombian and Peruvian origin and 
probably half of them (or more) have some family-related 
background to either country .
This region and Tabatinga, to be more precise, is import-
ant for learning about borders of solidarity for two main 
reasons . First, in the past years the Amazon border corri-
dor has caught the attention of international organizations 
and state authorities in relation not only to the illegal activ-
ities that have taken place there,4 but also mostly because 
of the influx of foreigners towards Brazilian territory . The 
National Committee for Refugees (the Brazil Ministry of 
Justice responsible for refugee-related policies and status 
determination) and the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) estimate that around twenty thou-
sand Colombians now reside in the Amazon region . Most of 
them are considered to be “of concern” for they have been 
displaced by the Colombian conflict . This number is five 
times the total number of refugees who have been recog-
nized nationwide by Brazil so far . Because of the difficult 
access and supposed absence of state/guerrilla interaction, 
Tabatinga presents itself as one of the main entry corridors 
to Brazil, given the relative intensity of traffic along its flu-
vial lines . These numbers are compounded by the almost 
fourfold increase in population experienced by Leticia in 
the past ten years (from ten thousand to forty-five thou-
sand inhabitants) . NGOs in the assistance front have also 
reported important increases in the number of displaced 
families in town . Official data indicate almost 160 families,5 
but many displaced do not fit the criteria for inclusion in 
the social programs implemented by Colombian author-
ities and, while present, remain invisible . The almost fifty-
year civil war in Colombia has generated one of the gravest 
internal displacement crises in the world, with an estimated 
three million people expelled from their houses and land .
Second, there are significant development inequalities 
between the countries .The image of Brazil is one of a land of 
opportunity and security for the poor rural and indigenous 
peoples on the Peruvian and Colombian side . As one assist-
ant worker stated,
The education system in Brazil is more welcoming and better 
structured than in Colombia . Schools are better in Tabatinga 
especially for the children . So there are issues in Brazilian develop-
ment and social investment that attract the poor in Leticia . And 
there are also things in Leticia that attract the Brazilian in these 
borders . But certainly, there is an inequality in the flow of people; 
it is thicker in the Brazilian direction, of course because Brazil is 
more developed .6
Moreover, for those fleeing the generalized conditions of 
human rights violations in Colombia, Brazil presents a dis-
tant but real opportunity for escaping and for claiming asy-
lum . The current estimates are that Colombia has more than 
three million internally displaced people (IDPs), though 
the data presented by UNHCR and the Catholic Solidarity 
Network has been contested by government officials . Not 
surprisingly, then, the issue of human mobility has become 
a priority topic within regional diplomatic negotiations . 
The coordinator of the Social Pastoral in Tabatinga, Father 
Gonzalo, recognizes that Tabatinga and Leticia, despite their 
calm atmosphere, are a time-bomb waiting to explode: “by 
the time violence reaches Leticia, they will all enter Brazil 
and request asylum .”7
Sovereign Appropriations of the Border Zone: The 
Mexico Declaration and Plan of Action (MPA)
The main focus of the MPA is certainly the Colombian con-
flict, the largest humanitarian crisis in the subcontinent, 
and its impact on neighbouring countries—Brazil, Ecuador, 
and Venezuela—especially in border zones . Mainly spon-
sored by Brazilian diplomats and UNHCR representatives, 
the final document was consensually signed . It relied on 
the active participation of civil society organizations for 
its implementation . The process that led to the agreement 
involved three sub-regional meetings between state author-
ities, international organizations, and also transnational 
and local networks, usually conducted by civil society types 
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of arrangements . Whereas in all sub-regions the meetings 
involved a direct dialogue between these three groups, the 
meeting of the subgroup of Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, 
Panama, and Peru had to be separated . Governments and 
non-governmental organizations met separately in part due 
to the Colombian government’s denial of many of the claims 
presented by civil society representatives . It was the only 
document which highlighted the need to balance the state-
based concern over security, involving “terrorism, organized 
crime, drug and arms trafficking and other types of trans-
national delinquency,” with the humanitarian claims of pro-
tection for those in conditions of vulnerability .
The MPA’s main conceptual innovation was to articulate 
solidarity, borders, and the treatment of foreigners, particu-
larly refugees . The notion of “borders of solidarity” advanced 
in that document looks to a means of bringing together 
institutional efforts of improving the humanitarian effects 
of national borders (for example, by granting free access of 
displaced and refugee persons to neighbouring territories) 
and the procedures of governing them and of sharing the 
burden of the refugee “problem” in the continent . Initially, 
this new regional approach seems to convey the idea that 
there is a growing convergence among multiple discourses, 
notably from a varied range of actors, on the notion of soli-
darity . Accordingly, what is meant by “solidarity” and how it 
is “engaged” in the context of borders is crucial .
The most acknowledged reading of solidarity is advanced 
by Emile Durkheim’s distinction between “mechanical” and 
“organic” solidarity .8 The first refers to the relationship estab-
lished between functionally similar units and the emergence 
of social structures that regulate and restrain action . The 
latter encompasses complex social formations comprised 
of functionally interdependent units in which solidarity is 
defined in terms of “mutuality .”9 In both cases, “solidarity” 
refers to a fundamental quality of the dynamics that connect 
social units within a system . In current sociological studies, 
as Rippe10 suggests, two major views are predominant . The 
first one describes acts “carried in order to support others, 
or at least to describe a disposition to assist [ … ] that arise 
from interpersonal relationships and ties .” This is the case 
of nationalism that explores the “categorical identity” of cit-
izens, who share “a specific dimension of culturally signifi-
cant similarity .”11 A second view, which Rippe calls “project-
based solidarity,” involves the condition under which one 
person makes the concern of another person or group, which 
faces a special plight, her own . Her (active and symbolic) 
assistance is directed at overcoming the particular problem 
or at finding a remedy for the special plight .12 Rather than 
competing views, as Rippe seems to suggest, neither of these 
approaches questions the need for borders as limits of com-
munities and, consequentially, of solidarity practices . In fact, 
the temporal quality of project-based solidarity indicates 
that, when it comes to others (foreigners, refugees, migrants), 
solidarity can only be a finite goal and the needs of such 
others are read and defined according to the assistant’s per-
spective . Thus, project-based solidarity does not oppose, but 
rather complements, solidarity practices informed by cat-
egorical identity qualities . The MPA is, in important respects, 
an attempt to convert the refugee problem into a temporal 
object of project-based solidarity that does not necessarily 
involve the reframing of the terms of practices of communi-
tarian or interpersonal solidarity .
As Turner and Rojek13 indicate, solidarity is usually inter-
preted in relation to scarcity, caught in the tension between 
the need for reciprocal and trustful relations and the com-
petitive drive of individuals . In that sense, the building of 
(national) communities is an attempt to reconcile these 
two ends, by limiting the scope of solidarity while, at the 
same time, defining the terms of “getting and giving” scarce 
resources . Therefore, displaced groups are seen as operat-
ing in the limits of this precarious balance, since their pres-
ence involves the need for sharing material and ideational 
resources with a community to which they do not belong . 
For the purposes of the discussion presented here, it might 
be more useful to think of solidarity as a discursive econ-
omy that produces social space through an emphasis on 
different aspects of connective elements between individ-
uals and groups (trust, reciprocity, subordination, equality, 
exclusion, etc .) . In the terms advanced by Calhoun, social 
solidarity can be directly related to the production of a pub-
lic sphere, defined as:
self-organizing fields of discourse in which participation is not 
based primarily on personal connections and is always in prin-
ciple open to strangers . A public sphere comprises an indefinite 
number of more or less overlapping publics, some ephemeral, 
some enduring, and some shaped by the struggle against the dom-
ination of others .14
Borders of solidarity are, accordingly, a battle between 
competing, yet also overlapping, publics and their perspec-
tives on how the border can (or should) become a space of 
life and of democratic engagement beyond the criterion of 
(statist) citizenship .
The policies devised in the MPA involved, for example, 
“support to implement a program with the objective of deter-
mining in a reliable manner the magnitude and the charac-
teristics of the refugee problem, with a view to identifying 
protection and assistance needs as well as to propose the 
most appropriate durable solutions,” the “reinforcement of 
institutional mechanisms for protection and refugee status 
determination; the formulation of a Regional Strategic Plan 
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to address the protection, basic assistance and integra-
tion needs of all of the populations in need, using a terri-
torial and differentiated approach .”15 This approach would 
involve fostering the social and economic development of 
border zones, particularly those isolated and impoverished, 
benefiting both refugees and local communities and taking 
into special consideration the specific situation of the rural 
population, women, children, and the elderly .
These “solidarity” policies are based on two main object-
ives . The first is to account for those who need protection . 
This strategy both measures and establishes a population 
of concern for whom needs would be assessed (magnitude 
and strengthening the refugee status determination) and 
promotes solutions . Second, there is a presumed need to 
reterritorialize mobile subjects and to intervene on the 
lived “spaces” of the border (integration and connection 
between uprooted and hosting communities), in order to 
articulate the relationships between local, national, and 
international levels . This reterritorialization involves, usu-
ally, the spatial containment of refugees and displaced 
groups within cities and delimited border areas, as well 
as their inclusion in a juridical framework in which their 
mobility is controlled and regimented by state and inter-
national officials . For integration to succeed, public poli-
cies of humanitarian protection should come alongside 
strategies of development promotion . Effective inclusion 
depends on transforming the figure of the displaced into 
an important part of projects of local development . It thus 
combines an effort at legal protection, in the form of grant-
ing and opening up access to the refugee determination 
process for those considered to be entitled to it, and social 
intervention on the spaces and limits of the communities 
which are receiving these groups .
When analyzing the strategies of Southeast Asian states 
in a global political economy, Aihwa Ong resorts to the idea 
of “graduated sovereignty”:
Graduated Sovereignty refers to the effects of a flexible manage-
ment of sovereignty, as governments adjust political space to 
the dictates of global capital [ … ] Graduated sovereignty is an 
effect of states moving from being administrators of a watertight 
national entity to regulators of diverse spaces and populations 
that link global markets .16
The MPA entails, I argue, a form of such a graduated 
sovereignty in terms of the management of mobility that is 
enabled precisely by a framing of the displaced as a popula-
tion and developmental problem . Once we know how many 
“potential” refugees and irregular migrants are out there, 
once we can count the uncountable,17 we will be able to 
devise the appropriate disciplinary mechanisms to resolve 
the problem . Institutions can be empowered to protect and 
integrate only those who the state determines are entitled to 
be part of the whole, and to separate them from those who 
are not . In addition, the MPA devises a transnational system 
of governance (involving states and international organiza-
tions) over mobility in an area that has been remarkably 
protected from external interference and democratic con-
trol .18 Rendering the mechanisms of governmentality more 
flexible is deemed necessary to respond to the emergence 
of social groups that potentially disrupt claims to author-
ity and territorial/national unity required for the exercise 
of solidarity .
We must not assume here that the state, and its sovereign 
prerogatives, constitutes a homogeneous actor . Flexibility in 
the management of populations provided by the construc-
tion of “borders of solidarity” requires the articulation of 
multiple levels of governance . Federal, provincial, and local 
authorities are all called upon, within their respective juris-
dictions, to implement and foster policies that permit the 
measurement of the magnitude of the “displacement” prob-
lem and at the same time allow for the inclusion and recep-
tion of those recognized as such . Federal governments have 
the prerogative of status determination and local/provincial 
sectors are activated during the integration phase of the 
process .
One of the subliminal problems with this approach is, 
first, that it fails to recognize the border as a living space and, 
second, that it hides the contradictory nature of the refugee 
legislation in most Latin American countries . Once recog-
nized as refugees, individuals face important restrictions 
against their mobility, one of which is the requirement of 
not returning to their countries of origin (and thus exacer-
bating in important respects the current situation of many 
who live in border areas and those who have transnational 
ties) and the prohibition of engaging in any political activ-
ity . It leaves unanswered the question as to what should be 
done with those who are deemed “worthy” of solidarity but 
who nevertheless inhabit spaces where such solidarity can 
only be partially upheld . It should be noted, however, that 
the MPA has been successful in bringing more attention to 
the issue of displacement in the region, as well as in pro-
viding incentives for states to review and adopt more inclu-
sive legislations in relation to refugee groups . Countries 
like Ecuador and Venezuela have expanded the range of 
rights and services available to Colombian asylum seekers 
and also reinforced the presence of humanitarian actors 
in border areas . Colombia has provided almost two billion 
dollars for an otherwise “rhetorical” program for IDPs and 
countries like Brazil, Argentina, and Chile are increasingly 
involved in resettlement projects of vulnerable IDPs living 
in border areas .19
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In the concluding note on borders of solidarity, the docu-
ment states: “solidarity can only be sustained through active 
cooperation between the State, civil society and UNHCR, 
with the financial contribution of the international com-
munity, within the framework of responsibility-sharing .”20 
The claim of sharing the burden over mobile populations 
is a common one in forced-migration discussions . The goal 
seems to be to activate a network of action that would per-
mit several actors to share the costs and responsibilities 
associated with the management of vulnerable populations 
with their cultural, social, and economic needs . This net-
work involves multiple levels of state-based governance and 
also civil society organizations .
Many scholars have highlighted the ways in which civil 
society neither accounts for the multiplicity of political sub-
jectivities in contemporary times nor represents the most 
legitimate voice in terms of the concerns and demands of 
those in conditions of social marginality .21 One might argue 
that the distinction between state and civil society, and 
moreover the emphasis on “civil” forms of social organiza-
tion, has foreshadowed other forms of struggle that happen 
in the interstitial spaces and by groups that do not necessar-
ily fit into the categories of traditional citizenship .22 Santos 
aptly points to the fact that in most of the world, and notori-
ously in the developing world, state and civil society have 
been intertwined as mechanisms of social regulation, and 
thus have not accounted for much of the politics and strug-
gles of social groups .
If in some core countries it could be reasonably argued that civil 
society had created its state, in the periphery and even in the semi-
periphery, the opposite had actually occurred . In the latter case 
civil society was thus an even more artificial entity than the state 
itself . The multiple social processes that were left out of civil soci-
ety, so narrowly defined were the gauge of the weaknesses of the 
peripheral and semi-peripheral states .23
The same point is advanced by Chatterjee when he identi-
fies a split between an elite organized domain, that of state 
and civil society, and an unorganized subaltern domain, 
which he calls political society . “Civil society restricted to 
a small section of culturally equipped citizens represents 
the high ground of modernity .”24 As he points out, polit-
ical society and subaltern communities negotiate within the 
high domains of state law and bureaucracy . They also move 
beyond it by asserting their own conflict resolution mech-
anisms, by providing alternative regulations of social life 
and membership, and very often by reacting and refusing 
to subsume themselves to the categories and interpretations 
of normality and legality given in a top-down perspective .25
Therefore, and taking these considerations on the rela-
tionship between civil society and state, it is not surprising 
to see the overlapping concerns between these two actors 
in the final accords of Mexico . It is important to emphasize 
that this is not a criticism of the intentions or the hard work 
done by groups and persons who have devoted their lives to 
helping others . The argument here is one focusing on the 
underlying conditions of possibility of such resolutions in 
relation to the treatment of difference that lies at the heart of 
border experiences . They are, henceforth, a criticism of the 
systemic conditions that make dis-“place”-ment26 possible 
in the first place and the consequences of engaging with 
multiple practices of solidarity from the perspective of abject 
populations .27 As such, despite recognizing the originality 
and creative effort underneath these initiatives, we have also 
to question the assumptions and mechanisms that are put in 
motion and the consequences, and costs, of improving the 
living conditions of displaced groups . We need to do so not 
only from the standpoint of sovereign actors but also from 
the perspective of those who live in these circumstances .
Humanism at the Border: A Social Assistance 
Approach
The relationship between Catholic missionaries and the 
Amazon border region dates back to the earlier colonial 
period . The religious component and the presence of the 
Catholic Church are important aspects of the social fabric 
in the border . Given the relative inadequacy of public servi-
ces and difficult access to social assistance, the Church has 
provided a fundamental network of support for those living 
in conditions of poverty and destitution .
The historical work of faith conversion has been somehow 
supplanted by a “moral rescuing” approach, aimed at fos-
tering strategies of local organization and activism . A Tri-
Border team of missionaries, church followers, and social 
workers was instituted and assists those involved in loosely 
defined experiences of human mobility . The work consists 
of providing orientation for those who have migrated to 
the region, for example by assisting them with presenting 
claims to state authorities at different levels . It serves as an 
assistance centre to which they can resort in cases of need 
or emergency and which provides programs of professional 
training and self-sufficiency in conditions of displacement, 
such as establishing collaborative projects with educational 
institutions and governmental agencies . The members of 
the migration “arm” of the HMT (Human Mobility Team) 
are very few and most of them are not from the region . 
Despite providing institutional assistance, the affiliation 
to the place is always transitory, except in very rare cases . 
They stay there for a couple of years and then are sent by 
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their respective dioceses to other missions . The HMT is thus 
mainly composed of migrants itself .
The missionaries live under very poor and strenuous 
circumstances . Their motto of “living for and with the 
poor” translates into a reality in which they are housed 
in one of the most vulnerable communities, the Union 
Neighbourhood, and funding is restricted to basic food 
and housing provisions . Given these restrictions, the help 
provided for those deemed to be in “need” is mostly of 
an advisory nature . The situation has changed slightly in 
regard to those requesting asylum in Brazil . UNHCR has 
now established a partnership with the HMT for the recep-
tion and assistance of asylum seekers in the region . UNHCR 
also pays for the expensive transportation fares of asylum 
seekers and refugees should they be willing to move inside 
Brazilian territory and after their application has been filed . 
Up to mid-2007, only eighty-two people have requested 
asylum in Tabatinga and have received the “refugee”-based 
assistance of the Social Pastoral . The majority of the work is 
then conducted with border dwellers and the displaced fam-
ilies who have not resorted or intend to claim refugee status . 
The situation in Leticia is even worse for there is no funding 
available except for that provided by the programs put in 
place by state authorities to help those who can be classified 
under he Displaced Persons Act . As one of the assistance 
workers stated:
Refuge is not an alternative to all of the displaced, except in the 
cases of those who have not adapted to living conditions here or 
whose life is really in danger . To leave, once again, can be even 
more traumatic, and honestly we have advised them about that . 
Very few displaced who come here know about the option of 
asylum, and even if they knew I am not sure they would opt for 
it: their decision to claim asylum would be based on an illusory 
evaluation of Brazil, thinking that it is a more developed country, 
with more opportunities . Life in Brazil is hard even for Brazilians, 
the language is a barrier and rural, poor peasants will suffer the 
most .28
In that sense, the approach adopted by the HMT is a more 
sensitive one because it recognizes the heterogeneity of dis-
placement and mobility experiences in the everyday lives of 
those they assist . They also have a clear understanding of 
the limitations of the governmentality structure in terms of 
bringing to light and resolving the multiplicity of demands 
and sometimes incongruent and incoherent requests made 
by these groups . They see the constraints on both sides of 
the equation, as states and international organizations try to 
regiment and to compartmentalize mobility experiences in 
terms of clear-cut categorizations and as displaced peoples, 
refugees, and other marginalized groups make claims to 
inclusion and help without necessarily taking the actions (or 
being willing to take the actions) needed to promote change 
in their lives . One might say these frustrations are also a 
by-product of the limits of our political imaginaries as they 
attempt to fit these liminal subjects into the categories of 
states and civil society . One of the missionaries vented his 
frustrations with the slow pace of people and change, stat-
ing, “one needs a lot of spirituality to work here as the sense 
of adventure vanishes off too quickly .” The sense of time 
is very different in the Amazon from that of global flows 
which refugee and displaced communities are supposed to 
be a part of—a global temporal frame marked by instantan-
eity and measured in real time . In a way, despite the desper-
ate condition of many of the displaced, they are still very 
much resilient to change (especially because they associate 
change with trauma) . And the social/spiritual workers feel 
discontented and frustrated with their moral and emotional 
attachment and the absence of short and mid-term results or 
significant impact in the life conditions on the border . One 
of them told me this is the fate of their “moral and humani-
tarian task,” a mixed feeling of responsibility towards desti-
tute others and of disappointment with the limited practical 
results achieved . The frustration comes, for example, as a 
consequence of the incapacity of untying the knots of struc-
tural social inequalities pervasive in the border and in the 
lives of border dwellers . Many of them choose invisibility 
and being undocumented as a strategy of survival and the 
state infrastructure only reiterates the fears and suspicions 
of these groups .
Nevertheless, the philosophy of the HMT work is one 
centred on ideas of vulnerability related to displacement 
experiences . They aim to provide a moral and religious ori-
ented program, with no discrimination based on faith prac-
tices, that would help individuals and families to overcome 
the traumas and violence that have led them to become bor-
der dwellers . They seek to speak for the displaced/migrant 
communities’ concerns with local authorities and other 
interlocutors, while at the same time attempting to elucidate 
and bring to light their realities and demands . The idea of 
solidarity has always been an intrinsic part of the Catholic 
network of social assistance; it has always informed the 
strategies of intervention between assistants and assisted in 
the context of human mobility as portrayed by these specific 
organizations . Claims to solidarity are also an intrinsic part 
of Catholic social theory, traced back to an original brother-
hood conception under which all humans are God’s chil-
dren . More than that, it is a solidarity approach based on 
a particular conception that, on one hand, recognizes the 
distinctions and differences in the ways dis-“place”-ment 
is experienced, and, on the other, assumes that these same 
experiences are lived by abject, marginal, vulnerable, and 
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victimized subjects . We are all the same under God’s eyes, 
but that equality cannot be fully realized in the here and 
now . All we can try to do is to alleviate and be responsible 
for the other, especially for those others who are in need . 
In important respects, this humanist approach to borders 
assumes a hierarchical standing not of individuality, but of 
suffering and agency . Because of their trauma and condition 
of invisibility, the displaced should be endowed with the 
means for making legitimate claims in relation to their com-
munity and also to official authorities . Even if their displace-
ment and mobility experiences are different and heterogen-
eous, their suffering and vulnerability is the same; they are 
victims of a system that inherently excludes and the space of 
exclusion they inhabit is a delimited and socially definable 
one . From that particular position, the goal of humanitar-
ian work is to make the displaced realize, through a medi-
ated form of subjectivity,29 that they have rights . In import-
ant respects, the HMT presents a contextualized approach 
to solidarity on border zones, that takes the lived experi-
ences of mobile subjects as its starting point, but that also 
subsumes them under the rubric of victimization .
Contesting Borders: Displaced Groups’ 
Interventions
The focus of state based organizations is in the ordering of 
the displacement “problem .” They aim at compartmental-
izing experiences of mobility under defined rubrics, as 
refugees, asylum seekers, irregular migrants, temporary 
workers, or permanent residents . These labels allow for pub-
lic policies to be devised and for “durable solutions” to be 
implemented in terms of integration, resettlement, or expul-
sion . Catholic assistance networks, in contrast, portray 
mobility experiences as contextualized and distinctive 
experiences . They emphasize the position of vulnerability 
and the need for a charitable, humanist approach to differ-
ence whose common denominator places them all equally 
under the rubric of “the poor” and needy . Despite their 
important, sensitive, and vocational efforts, the results have 
so far been limited and the challenges faced keep mount-
ing . Frustration and concerns over the sustainability of their 
strategies are amongst the many issues raised by those who 
devote their lives to helping others . Both strategies resort to 
claims that the border should be seen as a zone for exercis-
ing and performing solidarity acts towards those considered 
to be different . But what sorts of self-organized foundations 
have been put in place by the displaced groups in order to 
overcome their problems and survive in conditions of polit-
ical marginality?
Displaced groups know well the double nature of their 
condition of social marginalization . On the one hand, 
their situation derives from the poverty and destitu-
tion associated with uprooting processes: they have lost 
their businesses, property, and means of livelihood, and 
the cohesion of their families has been disrupted . These 
are the consequences of expulsion . On the other hand, it 
derives from their exclusion from both the national and the 
international realm, their being left in a permanent state 
of in-betweeness, as non-citizens and as non-foreigners . 
The international framework, even the one devised by the 
Mexico Declaration, does not create mechanisms to deal 
with internally displaced peoples, unless they become a 
recognizable “other” (as a refugee or asylum claimant, for 
example) . Hence, their negatively defined existence, in rela-
tion to conventional forms of belonging, becomes more 
Street vendors in the harbour area, Leticia . Carolina Moulin, 
2007, personal archive .
Street vendors in the harbour area, Tabatinga . Many of the 
migrants and displaced make their living on these sites . Carolina 
Moulin, 2007, personal archive .
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acute because they also inhabit a liminal time-space zone, 
that of the border .
In this context, and mostly in response to their own 
liminality, displaced families have tried to put forth asso-
ciations that would be able to speak for them and to press 
official authorities . In Leticia, two associations are now fully 
run by displaced peoples . Association 1 (A1)30 has been in 
place since 2004 . Forty-five families are actively participat-
ing in it and the appointed directors say their main goal is 
to search for resources, especially in the areas of education, 
health, and housing . They meet regularly and the convoca-
tions are usually on a mouth-to-mouth basis or through the 
local radio station . Every member contributes two thousand 
pesos (around three US dollars) whenever they can . One of 
the members stated how much had changed in terms of the 
discrimination and xenophobia faced by the displaced in 
the border zone:
When I arrived here, discrimination was really bad; it was unusual; 
now things are a little better . People think we are all displaced and 
that all the displaced live from government money, but this is not 
true . If we do not work, we do not eat .31
A case worth mentioning is that of Carmela . Despite liv-
ing in the border for almost seven years, she entered the asso-
ciation a few months before my arrival in the border . One of 
the reasons was that it took years for Colombian authorities 
to include her and her family in the protection network . She 
remained displaced in the border for six years without ever 
being recognized as such . Her husband was recognized but 
once she decided not to live with him, the government did 
not extend the protection to her and her children . For the 
past couple years, she says, they have received help, but very 
little .
I came to Leticia because my family was here, they supported 
me . I defend myself washing clothes, I am an ‘independent sales-
woman’—I sell clothes, cosmetics, and so on . But it is not enough, 
I have small but recurring debts . Debt is a problem for all the dis-
placed, life is very expensive here, we stay here just because it is 
very peaceful here . That’s the reason I remain here .32
The displaced that arrive at the border are supposedly 
informed of the presence of displaced peoples’ associa-
tions through Social Action, a governmental agency with 
a mandate to care for and manage the displaced families . 
They promote meetings and workshops . But they have also 
undermined the associations’ work by choosing non-affili-
ated displaced families to speak for the displaced commun-
ity, and this has disrupted grassroots attempts of creating an 
“interrupting” voice in the political debate in the area .
Here in the association we have people capable of speaking for 
and understanding the problems of the displaced community, 
but the Directors of Social Action have nominated outsiders that 
have nothing to do with the elected leaders of the association to 
speak on our behalf . We have sent communiqués to other enti-
ties denouncing this behavior and we will soon make this known 
to the central government . We have also scheduled a meeting to 
gather all the movement leaders to debate this situation . We want 
her replacement, by someone who can work in accordance with 
the displaced .”33
In her statement, Carmela makes two important claims . 
The first one states the ability and capacity of the self-
organized associations to speak on behalf of themselves . 
She refuses the mediated subjectivity that has been perva-
sive in border engagements . She responds to the disrupting 
policies of governmental authorities that aim at destabil-
izing their initiatives by disturbing their leadership role . 
Secondly, she reverses the traditional assertion that places 
them as the ones who should be in accordance with govern-
mentality strategies and victimization approaches . It is the 
official authorities that should work in accordance with the 
displaced; the displaced are entitled to demand from the 
appropriate agencies access to benefits and it is their duty 
to dialogue with them . The form of solidarity enabled by 
the experience of self-organization among the displaced 
enables an empowering position that reverses the systemic 
logic usually attached to the governing of mobility . It does 
so in very conflictive, rudimentary, and incoherent ways .
The associations face many constraints and problems, 
precisely because they have to work through their differ-
ences without erasing them, if they want to respond to the 
structural challenges presented by their condition (and 
especially in relation to the increasing pressure of multi-
level governance and networked action that has made its 
incursions in the region) . One of these problems is exempli-
fied by the breakdown of the association into two groups . 
One remained Association 1 (A1) and a new association 
(A2) was formed . Juan, the director of A2, explains the con-
flict in the following terms:
We were faced with many inconveniences . Inside the board, we 
witnessed many irregularities and we wanted things to be made 
in a different way . As a leader one must always be with the group . 
Because of these clashes, I decided to quit the Association and 
others did the same . So we were a numerous group and we decided 
to create a new Association within a strategy of more transpar-
ency and consistency . Right now, there is a lot of collaboration 
between the two associations, especially with the changes in 
direction that took place . The concerns of the displaced are the 
same, mainly related to economic concerns over survival and the 
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discrimination we face here . Many said that the displaced should 
be taken away from here . They even requested the Army Captain 
to arrange a flight to take us all out . So we scheduled a meeting 
and we showed the locals that we are also Colombia, that we could 
have moved anywhere but we chose to be here because we do not 
belong to this war, we are not the protagonists of the conflict, we 
are neither Left nor Right .34
Pablo, the Treasurer of A2, also highlights the conflict-
ive context that led to the separation, recognizing that many 
of the problems regarding the construction of a solidarity 
group remain:
The dismantling in two associations was caused by conflict . There 
was a disclosure of certain negotiations that were taking place on 
the leadership’s back . Those against these negotiations decided 
to establish another organization . But now we have new leaders 
and things have changed, but still the problem remains, of those 
taking advantage of these processes and ignoring both displaced 
associations .35
When looking at the narratives of mobile groups, one 
can see the emergence of alternative forms of solidarity that 
seem to contest the particular/universal divide pervasive in 
civil society arrangements and state-based discourses . It 
is an approach that fosters a sense of empathy of interests 
while retaining a central role for agency and, thus for con-
flict, precisely because they experience and relate to simi-
lar contexts in different ways . But that does not necessarily 
mean that because of that they forfeit their right to present 
claims, not as citizens, not as refugees, not as foreigners, 
but as displaced . As Juan stated, “we are also Colombia,” 
we are here, we have been there and we intend to stay . This 
is not to say that their efforts of solidarity organization are 
not presented with dangerous choices . At many times, they 
resort to the same language and discourses that have cre-
ated the conditions of possibility for their existence . They 
use a rights based discourse, even if disconnected from the 
traditional sites of citizenship; they fall back on appeals to 
a nation, to sovereignty prerogatives and to international 
organizations in an effort to translate their experiences 
to those who have never experienced or faced the disrup-
tions of forced displacement . But, at the same time, they 
emphasize that, despite not choosing to be displaced, they 
chose where to go for reasons related to the lack of immin-
ent conflict, proximity with neighbouring countries, family 
and ethnic ties, and so on . They chose to remain displaced, 
to not ask for asylum and thus to permanently yet precar-
iously live as a border .
Varying Solidarity Approaches to Borders
In important respects, to rethink the border as a zone of 
solidarity requires a questioning and reframing of how to 
deal with difference and mobility . In this concluding sec-
tion, I argue for the need to clarify the potential meanings of 
solidarity in order to avoid the reproduction of exclusionary 
discourses . What I have tried to show is that solidarity has, 
of necessity, to be differentiated . Contrary to what many 
presume, solidarity does not necessarily lead to political 
ideals of emancipation and the emergence of new forms of 
subjectivity, nor does it necessarily question the dichotomy 
between inside/outside as spaces of order/chaos . I propose 
three different types of solidarity with very different impacts 
over what it means to rethink borders in their relation to 
claims over mobility . The first one, managerial solidarity, is 
expressed precisely by the MPA attempts of improving refu-
gee protection in the continent . It is a meaning connected 
to strategies of control and discipline, that can improve the 
living conditions of refugees and locals who live in refugee-
like situations, but on the terms that they be defined as 
“refugees” and therefore in opposition to the “citizen .” The 
first action proposed by the MPA is to “carry out an assess-
ment of the number of persons who could benefit from this 
Plan of Action” and “present a study on the impact of the 
presence of asylum-seekers, refugees and other persons in 
need of international protection in the geographical areas 
covered by the program .”36 This is not to say that the MPA 
does not incorporate other groups who might be affected 
by the “refugee situation .” For example, in regard to public 
policies towards border areas there was a specific concern 
with making sure local populations would also be incorpor-
ated in the programs and would benefit from them, “since 
these populations are bearing the brunt of solidarity, despite 
being populations as needy and poor as the refugees them-
selves .”37 What is interesting to note is how the managerial 
discourse equates solidarity with strategies of development 
and with the obliteration of the demands of these groups, 
even while recognizing the collapse of both the mechan-
isms of international protection (which the Plan proposes 
to resolve) and of “citizenship” as the conveyor of rights and 
access to justice and equality .
The second one is what I call faith-based solidarity and 
is framed around ideas of unity or the need that for indi-
viduals to be in solidarity with one another “they need to 
develop a sense of self and become a community of fate .”38 
This sense of belonging can have either a localized or a more 
universalistic basis, either referring to small groups who 
share a particular identity or social position or referring 
to broader social contexts such as those based on claims 
over humanity . I argue that the perceptions presented by 
Catholic NGOs and some local level organizations tend to 
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rely on such definitions . They use a common origin, a claim 
to that which makes us the same and that ultimately justifies 
an erasure of alterity . In this way, and even though there is 
a legitimate concern with the well-being of the other, there 
is necessarily the creating of an “other” that is in the process 
victimized, impoverished, turned into an object of charity, 
and in need of moral and social rescuing .
Finally, a third possible meaning is what I frame as 
autonomous39 solidarity in which individuals and groups are 
able to share and advocate for common goals without hav-
ing to resort to a common denominator beyond difference . 
Their solidarity and coming together are rooted in the mul-
tiple ways in which differences are played out and performed 
in the global/local realities they live in but without the need 
for a complete convergence of ideals and identities . It is a 
coming together that recognizes friction40 as a productive 
moment and as a source of change and opening of possibil-
ities . It is a form of resistance that sees in that which separ-
ates us—the accident, the outside, the unexpected—a poten-
tial for reacting to hierarchies and exclusions . Arguably, 
autonomous solidarity is perhaps most directly related to a 
potential political imagination envisaged by a No Borders 
approach, by creating a public sphere of indistinction in 
which categorical identities, though still present, become 
increasingly irrelevant . Nevertheless, these are also incom-
plete and uncertain experiences of solidarity that have faced 
important practical limits in their conceptualization and 
implementation . One of them, as previously highlighted, is 
the drive towards unity based not on claims to the “inter” as 
in-between (as a cosmopolitan solidarity would entail) but 
on the national (even when the national is no longer there as 
is the case of displaced and refugees) .
In a way, all forms of solidarity present their openings 
and dangers . Even the ones who tend to respect, tolerate, 
and embrace a togetherness-in-difference, as the experience 
of the Displaced Associations in the Tri-Border zone exem-
plifies, are filled with uncertainties, mixed results, conflict, 
frustrations, and sometimes reproduction of the constitu-
tive elements that allowed for their displacement, such as 
those entwined in claims to nationhood and to citizenship-
related rights . To live in-between, to live as a border, presents 
enormous challenges . There have been attempts to circum-
scribe and to some extent re-inscribe these lives in the “nor-
mal” ordering of things . Even though well-intentioned, as I 
do believe is the case of both governmental and civil society 
initiatives, one should be clear about the assumptions and 
meanings involved in their claims . This paper has aimed at 
bringing to light what is involved in the representations of 
border zones and of conceptualizing borders as sites of soli-
darity from these two particular and privileged speaking 
positions . It has also attempted to contribute to a discussion 
of the narratives that have usually been disregarded, namely 
of those who live outside, or better said, in-between the 
national and the international, the citizen and the foreigner . 
The experiences of mobility and political organization of 
the displaced communities at the Tri-Border attest to the 
possibilities, and limitations, of alternative conceptualiza-
tions of political subjectivity and of perhaps less homogen-
izing strategies of building solidarity approximations . They 
are certainly embryonic, inceptive collaborations, but they 
speak, I believe, in important respects, to the anxieties ush-
ered by the failing design of citizenship,41 notably in the 
context of a developing world where the thrust of citizen-
ship was never complete in the first place .  If a No Borders 
world remains within our imaginaries of hope, border as 
spaces of diverse solidarities are already under way .
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